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Article text: 
 
While many elements of the European Commission have been the object of study, 
commissioners themselves and their cabinets have been less so, writes Renke 
Deckarm. He argues that, contrary to common belief, governments have limited 
influence over their commissioners’ cabinets or their approach in the Commission 
once appointed. 
 
Once every five years, European governments occupy themselves with selecting 
‘their’ European Commissioner and lobbying the Commission President for an 
important portfolio. In 2014, for instance, British Prime Minister David Cameron 
happily announced that Lord Hill would be responsible for financial markets, while 
French President François Hollande emphasised ‘his’ commissioner’s fit for the 
Economic and Financial Affairs portfolio. 
 
While the bazaar-like bargaining receives a sizeable amount of attention, little is 
known about the consequences afterwards. European Commissioners are not 
government representatives, so why do governments bother spending time to select 
particular individuals for the role? What do commissioners actually do, with whom 
do they work and how do they behave in conflicts between the European interest 
and that of the country they know best (which is how commissioners refer to their 
country of origin)? 
 
The Commission has recently received considerable academic attention. While we 
know much about civil servants, their orientation and beliefs, there is a surprising 
lack of knowledge of the Commission’s top politicians. Of course, this is due to 
methodological challenges: there are no records of Commission votes and the 
Commission’s outputs can hardly be attributed to a single politician. 
 
I have tackled this challenge and addressed the question of commissioners’ 
orientations by analysing the composition of their private offices, their cabinets. 
The idea is that commissioners select the members of their cabinets according to 
their intended behaviour – a commissioner interested in serving the national 
interest needs compatriots with connections to the government and the 
commissioner’s party, while a Commissioner serving the European interest might 
opt for experienced Commission civil servants. 
 
Probing deeper into this issue, I observed that cabinets are yet another 
organisational layer of the Commission which had not received the attention it 
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deserves – given that they are crucial in the coordination of Commission policies 
between commissioners and between commissioners and the services. Beyond using 
the biographical data of cabinet members to learn about their commissioners, I 
developed an interest in cabinets themselves. 
 
This resulted in a lot more work than I had imagined: I ended up with a dataset 
containing information on 1343 members of 149 commissioners’ cabinets between 
1995 and the present. Data were collected from Commission and other websites 
(such as LinkedIn or conference websites), but also via two surveys among 
Commission staff. A recently published paper in the Journal of European Public 
Policy makes use of this data. 
 
So who are these members of cabinets? Generally, members of cabinet are highly 
qualified and from diverse backgrounds. Member States try to ensure their influence 
by having their nationals represented in as many cabinets as possible. Indeed, the 
balance of nationalities in cabinets reflects current power relations in the EU as a 
whole. 
 
Figure 1 shows the personnel share of the EU’s six biggest Member States in all 
commissioners’ cabinets (note that the numbers refer to an entire Commission 
term). While the EU’s traditional heavyweights are in decline, Poland has 
successively built up its representation in cabinets. The current German dominance 
is reflected in cabinets (also by the fact that both Juncker’s and Barroso’s heads of 
cabinets were German). The British decline is especially noteworthy. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 | Share of Cabinet Members for the Six Largest Member States 
 
The educational background of cabinet members is diverse. Over the past twenty 
years, nearly 40 per cent were lawyers, and roughly one quarter were economists 
and another quarter social scientists. Also, they bring work experience from 
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different backgrounds, many having worked in national administrations before 
joining a cabinet. 
 
It is increasingly common to employ experienced Commission officials. The average 
Commission experience in cabinets rose from barely five years in 1995 to nine years 
in 2015. More generally, cabinet members have become more experienced. While in 
1995, they were 38 years old on average – this rose to 43 in 2014. The decades-old 
stereotype of cabinets with inexperienced, young entrants who have no real idea 
what the Commission actually does no longer holds. There is no gender balance yet. 
But the share of female members is continuously increasing (from 30 to 45 per cent 
over the past twenty years). 
 
The most fundamental argument against cabinets has been that they defend the 
national interest – and this criticism likely did not come out of nowhere. In 1995, 
three quarters of cabinet members had the same nationality as their commissioners, 
as Figure 2 demonstrates. This share is now constant at around 40 per cent. 
 
These changes – the declining share of compatriots and the increase in Commission 
experience – were the result of reforms by President Romano Prodi in 1999. He 
aimed to turn cabinets into offices supporting commissioners in their daily work for 
the EU. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 | Share of Cabinet Members with the Same Nationality as their Commissioner 
 
Nevertheless, there are very significant differences in the composition of 
commissioners’ cabinets. These differences, I argue, allow us to draw conclusions on 
commissioner intentions. Based on the data, I have tried to understand which 
commissioners intend to work in the European interest and those who do not. 
Commissioners from big countries are more likely to serve their national interest, as 
well as those working under a weak president or whose portfolio which is not 
considered very important.  
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The most interesting finding of this research again relates to Member States’ 
selection efforts – they seem to be in vain. I have not found any evidence that the 
relationship between a commissioner and the home government has an influence 
on the composition of his/her cabinet, and consequently on intended behaviour in 
the Commission. Whether the commissioner is a former Foreign Minister and 
member of a governing party or an academic not attached to the government, it 
does not seem to matter. 
 
This article draws from the author’s recent publication in the Journal of European 
Public Policy: The Countries They Know Best: How National Principals Influence 
European Commissioners and Their Cabinets. 
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